The nature of the presidency of the EU Council is changing. In the past it was –and to some extent still is– a job for an honest and neutral chairman, whose primary objective is to bring together the member states and build consensus. In order to be successful, the ideal presidency must put aside its own national interests, thus avoiding suspicions of any hidden agenda. In fact, to be a trusted partner many presidencies have traditionally withdrawn from taking any visible political position around two months before assuming the task.
This approach remains applicable in the cases of the so-called technical files that are left for diplomatic negotiations at the Council’s 133 working groups. However, the general character of any rotating presidency is not based on any single negotiation, be it within the Council or between the Council and the Parliament, but rather on the main political objectives and political results over the semester.
“The rotating EU Council presidency must be held with the approach of an impartial mediator, although Poland seems well placed to broker it according to its national policy lines (…) and thus strengthen the country’s position in the EU.”
In this general context, over the first half of 2025 Poland will be heading the EU Council presidency for the second time. Polish diplomats and politicians are taking over the baton from the largely untrusted Hungarians and their unique illiberal political perspectives (even President von der Leyen said in December 2024 that Hungary had made ‘many achievements during this term’ without calling them ‘good’). The controversies with Budapest started in July with a series of missteps by Viktor Orbán in international affairs and finished in December 2024 when Hungary failed to deliver a prolongation of the EU’s sanctions against Russia and granted asylum to a Polish opposition politician accused of 11 crimes against the state by Poland’s prosecution service.
The Poles’ self-proclaimed ambition is to ‘start to fix Europe’. The official programme has no motto with any double or equivocal sense such as Hungary’s ‘make Europe great again’, but does call for increased security on the continent. The Poles’s slogan ‘Security, Europe!’ covers four outward-oriented priorities linked to security and three inward-looking ones focusing on competitiveness.
The four priorities on external security are: (1) EU defence; (2) the stability of Europe’s borders with the development of new infrastructure projects; (3) foreign-inspired disinformation; and (4) the guarantee of energy supplies after the final withdrawal from Russian imports. In short, Poles are offering more security against the ever more dangerous external world.
The three inward-looking priorities aimed at an increased EU competitiveness are: (5) cutting the red tape for companies and deepening the single market; (6) making agriculture more competitive and resilient; and (7) taking care of issues related to the public health of the EU’s population, especially as regards young people.
For the time being, these are only broad outlines of what might be expected, including some indications about how the talks about money matters might develop. The first discussions on the future of the EU budget are expected to take place after 2027. Here Poland might take advantage of its position to frame the discussion in a way that is beneficial for Warsaw in the future. A similar process took place in 2011 when orienting the talks for the 2014-20 EU budget. Furthermore, Poland would like to see the Recovery Fund to be extended by at least a few more months in 2026, and as the Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius launched a new debate on how to increase the funding for the EU’s security investments, the issue should be debated by the Council.
Another major cross-sector question will be how to limit the incoming negative impact of the European Green Deal laws on the cost of life of both population and businesses. ‘Decarbonisation cannot take place at the expense of deindustrialisation’, said Ignacy Niemczycki, Poland’s EU Deputy Minister at a pre-presidency gathering in December 2024. Against the existing ongoing negotiations (on pharma reform or animal transport), the main focus on law-making will be on the new Commission initiatives. Contrary to previous five-year institutional cycles, the Commission will publish its 2025 work programme in February. This effectively means that Poland’s legislative action will be reduced to 4.5 months.
A major boost is expected in making progress as regards the accession negotiations of all the candidate nations in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, although the main partner continues to be Ukraine. The Ukrainian question also includes trade talks, which remain difficult due to significant external issues (mainly the Polish presidential elections in May 2025), the ongoing war and potential moves to end the conflict.
Other issues (both internal and external) will have a major impact on the presidency’s performance. The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January will impose a new perspective on matters relating to the transatlantic economy, security and political relations. Most observers in Europe expect some sort of economic-diplomatic attack against the EU (tariffs) or demands that the Union take on more responsibilities (as in the case of a potential withdrawal of US support for Ukraine).
The most important political factor in the EU will be the German national elections in February. Another important development will be the degree of weakness of the French government and the potential renewed assertiveness of the Hungarian government (especially in the context of vetoing foreign policy-related decisions).
The final factor to have an influence of the effectiveness of the EU Council Presidency will be the Polish presidential elections in May 2025. Although the country has a parliamentary regime, the President is elected by popular vote and has the power to veto laws as well as to oversee external security matters. In a highly polarised environment, Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s primary political objective will be to have the new President on his side. Therefore, the prospect of the presidential vote might affect how Poland deals with certain issues that have become highly politicised in the country, such as matters concerning the Green Deal (eg, the decision on decarbonisation goals for 2040) and Ukrainian trade talks (which are highly relevant to the agricultural and transport sectors).
This is not to say that we should expect a weak presidency. On the contrary, the government has planned a very active presidency marked by a ‘Warsaw perspective’ on many of its aspects. Adam Szłapka, the Polish EU Minister has said that the ‘EU has already started to speak our language’ on issues such as competitiveness and security. These six months will be an opportunity to convince the reluctant member states and the European Commission of the importance of Poland’s point of view on the EU budget or on delaying certain Green Deal laws (such as postponing the EPBD buildings directive as well as the ETS2 reform, among others).
The Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, on the European Council since 2023, is one of its strongest and most experienced leaders. He served as Poland’s head of government back in 2007-14 and as President of the European Council in 2014-19. Under his leadership the controversial Polish law on limiting asylum request rights was supported by the European Commission. On migration as well as security (promoting the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line projects), Poland has been on the offensive for over a year now. Poles have also been engaged with the Commission for months promoting a more pro-competitiveness approach and less limitations, hence von der Leyen’s announcement of the ‘Green Industrial Deal’ that answered Poland’s (and others’) worries in 2024.
Thus, the rotating EU Council presidency must be held with the approach of an impartial mediator, although Poland seems well placed to broker it according to its national policy lines (when they correspond with those of the European Commission) and thus strengthen the country’s position in the EU.
