Theme[1]: The EU plays a role as a regional security organisation within the UN. Its contribution to global governance can be improved but strategic decisions need to be taken on potential new missions for the Common Security and Defence Policy, beyond crisis management and in line with the values that guide the EU’s relationship with the UN Security Council.
Summary: The EU plays a role as security organisation that has several expressions. One of them is its action in conflict prevention and crisis management. A legal development of the mutual defence clause will provide the Union with a more relevant tool as a security actor. The second area in which the EU’s security role and its contribution to global governance are evident is in the implementation of coercive measures decided by the UNSC and even the adoption of its own restrictive measures. From an analysis of these issues there arise several guidelines for the EGS. These should provide normative criteria for the potential use of military force by the EU and its position on Security Council resolutions on sanctions as an essential part of its contribution to the United Nations’ efforts to maintain international peace and security. This paper will focus on the EU’s role as a peace-keeping actor and its role in implementing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and coercive measures. It will try to answer the question of whether the EU’s effective multilateralism implies following UNSC resolutions or whether it can limit their implementation according to its own values. Even if the EU is able to adopt its own restrictive measures, then the EGS should specify under what conditions.
Analysis: Since November 2011 the EU has enhanced observer status in the United Nations (UN), a privileged status[2] that allows it to speak before the representatives of major groups or before individual states, submit proposals and amendments, reply, raise points of order and circulate documents. However, the EU itself does not have voting rights but is instead represented by its 27 members, two of which –the UK and France– are permanent veto-holding members of the Security Council (SC). The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) obliges the EU members participating in the SC meetings to keep the High Representative and fellow member states informed and to defend the EU’s interests and positions (article 34 TEU). The obligation for them to request the High Representative to be invited to present the EU’s position on a Security Council agenda item does not impact on their right to form their own foreign policy (Declaration 14).[3] The eventuality of the EU taking up a seat on the Security Council,[4] even if logical from a qualitative point of view and coherent with the development of a European Foreign Policy under common principles is, however, a politically-sensitive issue among EU members.
In international conferences as well as in the General Assembly and other bodies and agencies, the EU speaks with one voice as a result of hundreds of internal EU coordination meetings held at the UN to develop a common EU stance.[5] Even if one voice does not necessarily imply a greater influence in multilateral negotiations and forums,[6] this remarkable success deserves to be highlighted at least as much as when there are cases of incoherence or disagreements. The coherence of EU action and its representatives is favoured by the Union’s unique international legal personality following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.[7] However, international coherence does not depend exclusively on the institutional tools available but on the political consensus among member states.[8]
The financial contribution of the EU and its member states to the UN budget is something to take into account as the first financial contributor: they provide almost 40% of the UN’s budget (followed by the US with 22% and Japan with 16.6%). More than 40% of the funding for UN peacekeeping missions comes for Europe and more than 13% of the peacekeeping staff as well. We will see how the EU operates its own missions to support the UN.
Within this institutional, legal and political framework, the EU carries out actions in areas that are essential to the UN’s aim of securing international peace. One of them involves its role as an international crisis manager, while another is its participation in coercive measures decided by the SC. In both cases it is possible to show that EU action tends not only to protect European interests but also to contribute to global security and governance. However, several issues need to be developed and perhaps also a new philosophy to take into account the changing strategic environment.
(1) EU involvement in UN crisis management operations: its increased role as a regional organisation after the implementation of the mutual defence clause
The EU is playing a major role as a conflict-prevention and crisis-management actor. Its role as mediator in international controversies threatening international security, such as with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes is significant,[9] while it is also active in the Middle East quartet.[10] In all of them, its position allows the EU to play a leading role as a balancing power among other big powers that are viewed as being more involved in supporting a particular party’s position. Special impact on the US position, for example, had the Iraq war in 2003. In this sense, it has been said that military action against Iraq did serious damage to the normative and institutional order embodied in the UN and reshaped it in the post-cold war era.[11] For this reason, before certain Middle East regional powers, the US lost its credibility as mediator even if, due to its enormous military and political power, its participation in the resolution of conflicts is essential.
At present, third generation peacekeeping operations (PKO) are performed by regional Organisations with or without express authorisation of the UNSC. In this sense, African Union Constitutive Act recognizes the right to intervene in a member state in respect of graves circumstances or situations that pose a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability; the only legal requirement seems to be a decision of the AU Assembly, or a recommendation of the AU Peace and Security Council.[12]Would it be legally possible a similar action by the EU? The Treaty of European Union is clear when says that, it shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the UN and, in Common Security and Defence missions, the Union will act according to principles of the UN Charter and International Law (article 21 TUE). The meaning of this, in principle, is that any use of force, except in self-defence, should count on the authorisation of the Security Council. However, one cannot ignore that there are interpretations of the Charter accepting that UNSC has the“main” responsibility in international peacekeeping but not the exclusive one. Development work on the Responsibility to Protect principle is the best example of the search by international community for alternatives to Security Council authorisation if this body is blocked by the veto of one of its permanent members. Of course, this is theory as in practice it would be difficult for the EU to approve a unanimous decision in that sense.
The European Global Strategy (EGS) should shed light on this issue[13] as well as under which conditions a mission developed by various Member States can be considered a EU mission or “under EU flag”. Currently a unanimous decision would be necessary including constructive abstention from several Member States.
Apart from operations performed by regional Organisations, there are also joint and hybrid UN operations with regional Organisations, mainly to guarantee humanitarian assistance in internal conflicts. Regional Organisations have coercive capacity or strategic authorisation for the use of force ex chapter VII. Since the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) first steps, the EU has played this role and developed cooperation with the UN in this area as a way to implement its proclaimed effective multilateralism (particular European approach to global governance). The relevant EU operations following UNSC resolutions ex chapter VII of the Charter were EUFOR-Althea, EUFOR-Chad/RCA, EUFOR-RD Congo and EUNAVFOR-Atalanta.
Whit Artemis operation, the EU started their autonomous peacekeeping and crisis management operations, coercive (with the strategic authorisation for the use of force by Chapter VII UN Charter) and outside European space with a concrete aim: supporting another international Organisation, normally UN or AU.
In this vein, EUFOR-Althea in 2004, was a stabilisation operation were the EU substituted NATO, organisation that assumed the implementation of not overflight obligation decided by UNSC resolution 816 (1992).[14] In July 2004, the UNSC, by resolution 1551 ex chapter VII, acknowledged the substitution of NATO by the UE. According to that, the EU Council adopted a decision on 12 July 2004 on the deployment of EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina with the main aim of supporting the implementation of the Dayton peace agreements.
Operation in Darfur was a second case of EU involvement of UN peacekeeping missions. It was a hybrid operation developed by the AU and the UN in Chad (UNAMID). The EU action in support of the AU Mission continued until the end of December 2007, when its mandate ended, and AMIS handed over to the joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1769 (2007). A second resolution (1778, on 25 September 2007) approved the multidimensional presence in Chad and in the Central African Republic. Supporting the African Union and the United Nations for political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Sudan), the European Council approved on 15 October 2007 the common action 2007/677/CFSP establishing EUFOR Chad /RCA, with a force of maximum 3700 troops.
As a reaction, the EU Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP approved the launch of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta[16]; its mandate includes authorisation for the use of force when necessary.
The most recent EU CSDP missions, even if some are related to UNSC resolutions, cannot be included within this category, as they don’t imply EU forces as such. Military or civilian missions, their aim is mainly training security forces in the host country (EUTM Somalia[17], EUCAP Sahel[18] or EUTM Mali[19]), the Security Sector Reform or nation-building action (EUAVSEC South Sudan)[20]. All of them are Petersberg tasks that the EU assumed by Treaty, however they are peace-building missions more than peace-keeping operations stricto sensu.
These missions, especially the ones in countries living a war situation like Libya[21] or Mali, are clearly insufficient for the European Union to be seen as a regional security player; but are the only ones accepted by all member states. This shows the difficulties to advance in certain cases or actions already implemented outside the EU framework, such as Libya or Mali, where a small number of member states are involved in an international operation more demanding.
Apart from these international experiences in military crisis management that the Treaty of Lisbon codified in title V EU[22].the inclusion of a mutual defence / mutual assistance clause (article 42.7 TEU) recognizes the right of Member States, in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter, to aid and assistance by all the means in their power to one of them victim of an armed aggression from a State on its territory. It allows for a military answer only after the attack, not in a preventive way[23]. The clause implies the undoubted recognition of the EU as a regional defensive organisation in the sense of the UN Charter, chapter VIII.
However, there are several questions that the ToL doesn’t clarify, and the EGS should do, i.e. the automaticity of the application of the clause. Even if some authors have considered the TEU mutual assistance clause as automatic in its application, our approach is against this interpretation for historical and practical reasons. Historically, during the constitutional process, the mutual defence clause was considered as a flexibility clause that member states could subscribe or not. If we add that the use of military force is a discretionary capacity of member states, and that some member states qualify themselves as neutral, it seems coherent to infer from this that the clause is not of automatic application but that each state has to decide its reaction to an armed attack of other member state. Any decision on this domain requires the unanimity of the Council and constructive abstention is open to the states. This special “opting out” case-by-case possibility reinforce our position according to which one member state cannot be obliged to use automatically the force as a response to an armed attack against another one.
It is difficult to imagine a practical application, however the clause can be useful for EU members not belonging to NATO and for non-European territories of European NATO members. For these reason, the European Parliament recently asked the High Representative for a rapid implementation of this clause in order to guarantee a similar level of security for all European citizens.[24]
Several problems opposed to the implementation of the clause: institutional or structural, budgetary and political. First, it seems clear the need of a European Headquarter allowing an autonomous and permanent planning for operations. Second, the defence budget restrictions call for a major coordination between NATO and EU for the assistance before an armed attack. Finally, no development is possible without the will to act European; political will is essential and may promote the revision of national security and defence strategies. For these reasons, the EGS should cope with above obstacles in order to allow the clause to deploy its full potential.
Together with the conditions for the use of force, for the application of the mutual defence clause and its role as peacekeeper, the last question needed of further clarification for the global understandig of the EU as a regional Organisation, is the implementation of UNSC resolutions imposing coercive measures, mainly on people suspected of terrorism, adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter.
(2) Implementation of UNSC resolutions on sanctions: can a normative power limit the Security Council’s powers?
Coercive measures adopted by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter are a tool to react to violations on international rules by a way previous/other than the use of force. Upon this norms sits the international order, therefore they are a fundamental element of global governance. They represent the international institutional reaction against States or persons whose behavior threats international peace and security. They are compulsory for all United Nation members (article 25 Charter). For this reason, the EU has to implement them in order to fulfill its member state’s duties. At the same time, the UE shows itself as a security actor.
The application of UN Security Council resolutions on security and defence field needs a CFSP common position and the approval of a regulation on the basis of the former articles 60, 301 and 308 TCE for the effectiveness of them within the Union. Now the legal basis for the adoption of such a measures is the article 215 of the TFEU.[25] This is the case for sanctions against people suspected to belong or participate in terrorist networks. Once adopted the internal rule, it works as any other EU legal norm and, as such, its validity may be contested before the EU Court of Justice.
The most important resolutions from the UN Security Council adopting measures against Taliban and banning exports of certain goods and services to Afghanistan are resolution 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1353 (2001). [26]
A judicial action for annulment of the EU rules implementing UNSC resolution is possible by individual affected by these regulations, claiming against its validity for non-compliance with human rights requirements, mainly the rights of defence and judicial review. And this happened when Yassin Abdullah Kadi, affected by those measures, went before the Luxemburg Court of Justice. The Kadi case (2008) forced the EU Court of Justice to tackle directly with the efficacy within EU of a UNSC resolution imposing sanctions to individual supposed to be connected with terrorist groups. The first judgment by the Tribunal of First Instance (TFI, now General Court)[27] said that Security Council resolutions engaged the EU who has to adopt all necessary measures for member states to implement them; so, there were no right for the EU to review the lawfulness of the EU regulation as based on a UNSC resolution. The Court’s argument was based on article 103 of the UN Charter according to which it prevails over Constitutive treaties, except against Ius Cogens. It was clearly an interpretation from the International Law point of view. However, the Court of Justice (CJ)[28] annulated the TFI judgment and considered that fundamental rights (in this case the right to be heard, to an effective judicial review and to respect for property) should prevail over Security Council resolutions. In this vein, an obligation imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, More recently, in its judgement of 2010 on the same case, the Court stated that it was not for the Community judicature to review the legality of a UNSC resolution, but examining the legality of a Community act which merely implements it necessarily amounts to a review of such a resolution. Such judicial review is liable to encroach on the Security Council prerrogatives.
Some scholars argued that this judgment goes against UNSC authority. However, it is also possible to understand that it can promote Security Council to adopt mechanisms to compensate the lack of legal protection for individuals in front of fundamental rights restrictions.[29] Otherwise, one should ask for the EU legal position if, implementing the UNSC resolution, violates International Law norms from the Charter and part of peremptory norms such as those protecting fundamental human right to defence before the courts in legal procedures. Neither member states, nor the bodies of the United Nations can derogate human rights universal protection because it constitutes “intransgressible principles of International Customary law”.[30]
Therefore, even if the implementation of coercive measures decided by the UNSC is now under the European Treaties, the interpretation that should be followed in controversial situations, as the one described, is not clear. The final legal solution is in the hands of the EU Court of Justice, but the EGS could state the relevance for the EU to preserve its normative role, even against a formal Security Council decision. This way will promote the EU international identity based on the respect of the rule of law and universal human rights.
Apart from applying UN coercive measures, and based on article 215 TFEU, the Union can also approve restrictive measures as a way to participate in international mechanisms to react before illicit behaviors. Reacting autonomously in such a way, the European Union fulfills different aims. The first is to protect international peace and security; this is clear when it follows UN resolutions but, in some cases, the EU goes further than Security Council and improves the punitive content or the scope of the measures. The second aim can be the respect of values shared by the EU and third States, i.e. Cotonu agreement EU partners or States participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy. The agreements with all these countries consider democracy, rule of law and human rights as essential part of the relationship with the EU and hence the violation of these values empowers the Union to legally react. The last aim for EU restrictive measures can be the respect of universal principles.[31]
From scanning the possible purposes of EU sanctions follows that the Union not only pursues its own interests but acts within the complex global governance gear. In this way, the EU reaffirms its normative identity and makes a relevant contribution to international governance by influencing the behavior of the target State or persons. The approval of restrictive measures is a constitutional measure but the Treaty does not contain criteria for the EU to approve restrictive measures and for assessing their efficacy. The EGS could try to balance the efficacy of such measures with their impact on the EU international image: the restrictive measures can have an effect of reassess the Union as a normative and trustful actor or as a neocolonialist one if the EU has a double standard for the adoption of the measures, depending on the target State.
Conclusions: From the previous presentation we can conclude than the EU is today a regional Organisation in the sense of the chapter VII of the UN Charter, and acting under the article 51 of the Charter, as it contributes to the UN aims and to implement its resolutions aiming at maintenance of international peace and security and, since the ToL has a right to collective defence.
In an increasing number of international crises the Security Council is blocked. The question immediately arises, in this case for the EU and its Member States, is whether it is possible to act outside the authority of that body for the sake of universal values or protection of persons. The international community efforts in order to codify the Responsibility to Protect find troubles, mainly because political reasons or political use of the principle[32]. However, it is important for the EU to have a common position on the topic, to establish limits and guarantees for the potential use of force, according to UN principles but without Security Council authorisation; but also for alternative measures included in the large concept of responsibility to protect. A political document like the EGS provides the occasion to Member States to agree on the issue and consider normative arguments to act in such a way and obtain the endorsement by the international community. The guidelines could go in the direction pointed to by the UN Secretary-General’s report on the role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect[33].
The Security Council frequently uses the Union for the enforcement action under its authority. As an enforcement agency, the EU is under the authority of the Security Council. However, we cannot deny the existence of legal and political controversies on the legitimacy of the Security Council action in some occasions. Mainly after 9/11 attacks, the tradition of the United States to use the United Nations to shape global norms and innovative approaches to peace and security, as the self-defensive action in Afghanistan and Security Council resolution 1373 on terrorism, has increased. For some states it was seen not as an attempt to adapt existing norms and institutions to new threats, but rather to tear them down and start again from scratch. The obvious result is a damaged UN Charter-based legal order. But European –and American- interests are embedded in this order; hence the importance of its recovery.
Refusing the implementation of the UNSC resolution that doesn’t respect human rights, or establishing a judicial control at European level, the EU can contribute to the recovery of the UN Charter legal order and be a force keeping the attention of the Security Council about its politicisation.
On the path to be an autonomous international security actor, the EU should count on clear guidelines concerning the use of force and the submission, where appropriate, to UNSC resolutions. The strengthening of the EU normative role, according to EU Court of Justice (Kadi) following its constitutional principles and values, can only benefit its autonomous and credible role in international arena and reinforce the European identity as international actor. It can also reinforce the legitimacy and the global implementations of some UNSC resolutions. Also political guidelines are needed for the adoption of autonomous restrictive measures.
Now the EU tries to elaborate a European Global Strategy (EGS) to develop an external action perspective. This perspective has to do with power, influence and the possibility for the EU to play a role according to its values and interests. The EU call of attention to the Security Council about the content and procedures for its resolutions imposing sanctions for terrorism reasons, or the approval of autonomous restrictive measures –sometimes because there is no consensus at the SC level– can be a way to promote and reinforce its normative role as a distinctive actor, different from the US, and coherently with Europe’s proclaimed values.
Natividad Fernández Sola
University of Zaragoza, Visiting Professor at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow
[1] This paper is one of the Elcano Royal Institute’s contributions to the European Global Strategy Project..
[2] Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations, Draft Resolution A/65/L.64/Rev.1, United Nations.
[4] The European Parliament voted on 9 may 2011 in favour of requesting a EU own permanent representative at the UN Security Council. The move has been met with condemnation from some EU members, who believe that allowing the Union in is a step too far. European Voice newspaper reported., RT 11.5.2011, http://rt.com/news/eu-un-security-council-representative/. See Spongenberg, Helena, “EU heading for single UN SEAT, UN oficial says”, EU Observer, 3 October 2006.
[5] Statistics about the increase in the General Assembly, where the EU voted unanimously on 97% of the occasions, in http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10999_en.htm. One exception arose at the end of 2011. For an academic approach see M.O. Hosli, E. Van Kampen, F. Meijerink & K. Tennis, “Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: the Case of the European Union”, Paper presented at the ECPR Fifth Pan-European Conference, 24-26 June 2012, Porto.
[7] Previously, the legal existence of the EU together with the EC generated a diverse international representations and confusion among third states. Fernández Sola, N., “La subjetividad internacional de la Unión Europea”, Rev. Derecho Comunitario Europeo, n.11, 2002, pp.85-112
[8] Barbé, E. (ed.), Cambio mundial y Gobernanza global…, cit.
[9] E3+3 talks on Iran’s Nuclear Programme is a diplomatic effort launched in October 2003 by the European Council, France, Germany and United Kingdom aimed at resolving the issue through negotiations. In 2006 they adopted a joint proposal together with China, Russia and United States (P5+1 talks involving the 5 permanent UNSC members and Germany). On the other side, the EU supports international efforts to promote peace and stability on the Korean península, in particular through the Six Party Talks process, set up in 2003 to address international concerns over North Korea’s nuclear activities.
[10] The EU participates in the Middle East Quartet together with United Nations, United States and Russian Federation which in 2002 launched a roadmap for peace aimed at resolving the conflict.
[11] I. Jonhstone, “US-UN Relations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order) As We Know It?”,EJIL (2004), vol.15, n.4, pp.813-838.
[13] Simón, L. “No mighty, no right: Europeans must rediscover military power”, Real Instituto Elcano, European Global Strategy Project, EGS 2/2013, 19 March 2013. The autor clearly explains reasons for overcome the limits that European Treaties set for the use and projection of military power in order to allow it to better adapt to a changing international context and improve its contribution to global governance.
[14] Res.816 (1992) authorized all member states, on a national basis or by a regional organisation, to adopt all necessary measures in air space over Bosnia Herzegovina to implement the obligations of not overflight. UNSC Resolution 1575/2004 was the basis for EUFOR-Althea. Mission was prorogued by UNSC resolutions 1639/2005, 1722/2006, 1785/2007, 1845/2008, 1895/2009, 1948/2010, 2019/2011 y 2074/2012, under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
[16] Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta); previously, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast
[17] Training mision (EUTM) in Somalia was launched in support of UNSC resolution 1872 (2009) and is conducted in liason with Somalian government and its international partners: UN and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as well as the US government. Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010, OJ L 44, 19.2.2010. On the 12 December 2011, the Council approved the concept for a new Common Security and Defence Policy mission to support regional maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean states. This decision kicks off operational planning for the EUCAP Nestor mission in the Horn of Africa.
[18] EUCAP Sahel is a civilian mission for increasing capacities of Nigerian security forces to fight terrorism..Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012, OJ L 187, 17.7.2012..
[19] EUTM Mali is a military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces according to the Security Council call to respond swiftly to preserve stability across the Sahel region. The UNSC invited international partners, including the Union, to provide assistance, expertise, training and capacity-building support to the Malian Army and security forces. Council decisión 2013/34/CFSP, OJ L 14, 18.1.2013.
[20] EU Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC South Sudan) develops UNSC resolution 1996 (2011) where the UN body underscore the need for forging stronger and well-defined partnerships among the UN, development agencies, bilateral partners and other relevant actors to implement national strategies in the new Republic of South Sudan aimed at effective institution-building. Council decisión 2012/312/CFSP, OJ L 158, 19.6.2012.
[21] The EU is preparing a civilian CSDP mission in Libya to suport national authorities in enhance border security
[22] According to articles 42 and 43 TEU, Petersberg Missions will guarantee peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and international security reinforcement, always according to UN Charter principles.
[23] Fernández Sola, N., “Les clauses d’assistance mutuelle et de solidarité du traité sur l’Union européenne : contenu, délimitation et garanties politiques et juridiques”, Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Joël Molinier, LGDJ, Paris, 2012, pp.203-220.
[24] European Parliament, Report on the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions, A7-0356/2012; 30.10.2012.
[25] Article 301TCE referred to adoption of economic measures against third States in order to fulfill CFSP economic sanctions; article 60 was about Council adoption of economic sanctions; and article 308 TCE were the residual competence clause. The ToL, in article 215 says that a CSDP decision can provide for the interruption or reduction of economic and financial relations with third countries; the Council should then adopt the necessary measures, by qualified majority, as well if restrictive measures are against a natural or legal person.
[26] EU Council approved common position 1999/727/CFSP implementing the firs UNSC resolution and common position 2001/154/CFSP and regulation 467/2001 and 881/2002.
[27] Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, extended composition) of 21 September 2005. Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities. Case T-315/01.
[27] Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008. Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union andCommission of the European Communities. It analizes the Common Position 2002/402/CFSP and Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 deciding measures against persons and entities included in a list drawn up by a body of the United Nations. A final judgment was adopted by the General Court on 30 September 2010. Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission, Case T-85/09.
[30] Advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, p.226.
[31] Beaucillon, Charlotte, “Comment choisir ses mesures restrictives? Guide pratique des sanctions de l’UE”, ISS European Union, Occasional Paper 100, Décembre 2012.
[32] Bellamy, A. J., Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect. From Words to Deeds, London, Routledge:2011; Knight, W. A., Frazer Egerton (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, London, Routldedge, 2012; Thakur, R., The Responsibility to protect. Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics, London, Routledge, 2011.
[33] S/2011/393.
